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meaning from the foundational model of communi-
cation – or what I call the model ‘to-’, the index of all 
such modelling2 – Guattari would have seen this as 
merely a ‘skirmish’ with meaning. After all, Weaver 
justified consideration of the semantic problem of 
communication only to the extent that the theory 
of the technical problem, namely accuracy, ‘over-
laps’ it.3 Weaver was focused on understanding 
the receiver of messages and his/her behaviours. 
The real issue remained, quite clearly, the extent 
to which primary, technical, asignifying messaging 
overlapped and subsumed analytic, secondary and 
tertiary levels of meaning and effectiveness (those 
affecting conduct).
 Guattari regarded information theory’s ‘skir-
mish’ with meaning as a ‘rearguard semiological 
conflict’ – without mentioning Weaver specifically.4 
What Weaver does is add new stations to the 
communication model, even if, at the same time, 
these stations capture and arrest destratifying 
tendencies from Shannon’s initial eschewing of 
meaning. [fig. 2] Weaver increases the number of 
boxes within the model of communication by interpo-
lating a semantic receiver between the engineering 
receiver and the destination. As he explains, ‘this 
semantic receiver subjects the message to a second 
decoding, the demand on this one being that it must 
match the statistical semantic characteristics of the 
message to the statistical semantic capacities of the 
totality of receivers, or of that subset of receivers 
which constitute the audience one wishes to affect’.5
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Asignifying semiotics, understood in its most general 
sense as any system of signification that dissociates 
itself in some manner from a meaning component, 
or considers meaning as an irritant, has an approxi-
mate birthdate in the late 1940s. The moment when 
information theorist Claude Shannon contrasted 
an everyday definition of information based on 
semantic content with a technical one based on 
uncertainty, the ‘irrelevance’ of meaning for commu-
nication understood as an engineering problem was 
born.1 [fig. 1] This gesture towards pure destratifica-
tion did not hold for very long. Shannon’s colleague, 
Cold War bureaucrat of big science Warren Weaver, 
worked the ‘semantic problem’ back into his popular 
explanation of Shannon’s communication model 
shortly thereafter. Once out of the bottle, however, 
the genie of meaning has had to run an obstacle 
course against the forces and factors displacing it; 
that is to say, recourse to what could be commu-
nicated, defined logarithmically in bits, the 
probabilistics of choice, and the redundancies that 
shape it, all of which determine the relative entropy 
of theoretical information systems. Shannon’s inter-
ests in both abstract and concrete mathematical 
machines, especially relay circuitry and secrecy 
systems, but also chess-playing computers and 
electromechanical maze-solving mice, offer a proto-
machinic perspective of strata-crossing, apparently 
in the spirit of Guattarian thought.
But not so fast. While it seems obvious to index 
an ‘origin tale’ on post-war information theory since 
it provides an influential example of expunging 
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asignifying semiotic figures are not themselves 
molarised, burdened with redundancy, or prevented 
from undertaking phagocytic or parasitic activi-
ties.10 Moreover, the cyberneticisation of the model 
by Shannon meant that the point-to-point sender-
receiver could perhaps be automatically monitored 
and noisy messages ‘corrected’. Shannon imag-
ines an observer (‘auxiliary device’) with the ability 
to parse capacity and micromanage the balance 
between time, bandwidth and signal power, in 
this way the ambiguities of semantics need to 
be translated into statistical trends in messaging 
and audience absorption levels. [fig. 3] This fuzzy 
remodelling11 was handcuffed by the addition of 
more and more components (doubling) whose 
machinic potential was not fully realised since the 
‘subjective’ observer is never fully automated except 
in the simplest cybernetic systems. The fuzzy line of 
escape ran straight into two constraining layers of 
personified components: senders, receivers, and 
the one ‘above’ them both – the observer.
In the maieutics of Shannon and Weaver, infor-
mation theory is an obvious yet ambivalent point 
of departure for a theorisation of the adventure 
of asignification. However, it is also a quite useful 
one since it underlines some of the tensions in its 
theorisation. And it is to these constructive tensions 
and instructive entanglements that I want to turn in 
more detail as I lay bare the finer points of Guattari’s 
development, conceptualisation, and descriptive 
deployment of asignifying semiotics within the devel-
opment of his nascent theory of semiocapitalism.
In three books published originally in 1977 and 
1978, in the two editions of Molecular Revolution, 
and in The Machinic Unconscious from 1979, 
Guattari elaborated a typology of semiotic systems 
framed in a Peirce-Hjelmslev hybrid conceptual 
vocabulary. Asignifying semiotics are defined rela-
tionally by Guattari against signifying semiologies, 
beyond which are asemiotic encodings. In spatial 
terms, then, asignifying semiotics and signifying 
Further, Weaver then introduces a new kind of 
noise – ‘semantic’ – which he inserts in between 
the information source and the transmitter: ‘the box 
previously labelled as simply “noise” now being 
labelled “engineering noise”. From this source is 
[sic] imposed into the signal the perturbations or 
distortions of meaning which are not intended by 
the source, but which inescapably affect the desti-
nation. And the problem of semantic decoding must 
take this semantic noise into account.’6 In short, with 
Shannon and Weaver we never entirely get beyond 
signification and remain trapped in an intermediate 
phase where machinic potential is constrained 
by the vagaries of what Guattari dubs ‘human 
“understanding”’,7 which slows down an otherwise 
accelerating destratification of meaning. Guattari 
remarks on information theory that it ‘attempted to 
salvage something from the semiologies of signi-
fication in defining the significative redundancies 
as being in inverse proportion to the quantity of 
information’.8 An increase in redundancy can help 
clean up errors, but it slows down processing time, 
decreasing the amount of information, whereas a 
decrease in redundancy gains in efficiency and 
evenness, but this increases the amount of informa-
tion since unexpectedness contains more of it.
What Guattari would have us grasp is that ‘the 
remainders of a signifying process accumulate in 
the same manner as other strata of encoding. Lines 
of interpretance with their hierarchies of content, 
and lines of significance, with their controlled 
proliferation, become a kind of raw material for 
the construction of a-signifying sign machines.’9 
Enhancements of the strata within the point-to-
point model, which became a specialty of sorts for 
Weaver, increase the representational redundancy 
of the model and limit its lines of proliferation, or at 
least slow them down by the process of assimilating 
semantics to technical issues. So, the very factors 
that produce slowness also point forward towards 
intensive machinic productivity. To add a point of 
clarification: by ‘inhabiting’ a redundant molar model, 
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Fig. 1:  Shannon and Weaver Model of Communication




‘deriving their efficacity from the fact that they rely 
upon a certain asignifying machine’.16 That is, they 
may find the deterritorialising tendencies of asigni-
fying semiotics helpful in blurring the territories of 
the body or certain institutional spaces. But in the 
very crossing between the systems and generation 
of significations, new territories are breached and 
powers engaged, perhaps leading to the imposition 
of a more rigid definition, or conversely, to claims 
of incoherence. As the information model suggests, 
the intermediate position reveals that there is too 
much raw material to process, that the transfor-
mations of raw organic matter into humus have 
ceased, or that the further decomposition of humus 
has stalled as its stability has peaked.
Guattari’s conceptual language sometimes 
includes examples from soil science, such as we 
find in The Machinic Unconscious: ‘a-signifying 
components develop to some extent on the manure 
of signifying components; they proliferate like micro-
scopic parasites on modes of subjectification and 
conscientialization’.17 Taken together with the auto-
mation of signifying semiologies by asignifying 
semiotics, the growth of asignification, like mush-
rooms on the manure of signification, recommends 
the use of humification as a complementary term, 
and of the mixity of the semiotic processes that 
Guattari identifies. 
The absence of a meaning dimension is less 
pertinent for Guattari than what is caught in the 
removal process: both representational and mental 
dimensions. Guattari has us think of the ‘coefficient 
of deterritorialization’18 as a constant quantity that 
modifies variable sign machines, often by allowing 
them to act by duplication at places outside human 
perception. Hence, his penchant for soil examples. 
Guattari actively decentres enunciation from the 
human subject to machinic, non-human assem-
blages of proto-enunciation. Decentring human 
subjectivity for the sake of machinic proto-subjec-
tifications is one of the broad theoretical goals of 
semiologies are located on the semiotic strata, 
and these strata are not isolated from one another. 
[fig. 4] Like the Shannon-Weaver models introduced 
above, Guattari’s line diagram features boxes and 
arrows, but without separations, and, importantly, 
without a temporal dimension, which can be added 
to indicate the processuality of destratification. 
Indeed, what is instructive about Guattari’s diagram 
is that its adumbration shows how strata accumu-
late like ‘humus’ in compost and break down over 
time.12 This language suggests there is something 
quasi-organic about asignification or, put otherwise, 
that it is not only artificial. Put differently again, the 
machinic is irreducible to the mechanical. It is what 
the organic and inorganic examples share by exclu-
sion that interests Guattari. More on this shortly.
Signifying semiologies concern well-formed 
substances situated on the stratified planes of 
expression and content, with the proviso that the 
transits among these strata are linguistic. Symbolic 
semiologies are a species of signifying semiolo-
gies and concern substances of expression that 
are neither completely translatable into linguistic 
terms, nor are they able to be overcoded by any 
one substance of expression among them. This 
rule of non-translatability and non-linearity keeps 
at bay linguistic imperialism: ‘the semiological line-
arity of the structural signifier which imposes itself 
despotically over all other [non-linguistic] modes of 
semiotisation’.13
Guattari is never done with signifying semiolo-
gies; one never really abandons them altogether. 
They are ‘raw material’.14 Asignifying semiotics puts 
signifying semiologies into play in some manner; in 
this way, asignifying semiotics are not infected with 
semiological well-formedness, but it is something 
to which they may have recourse if communicating 
in the way that dominant significations require. But, 
Guattari boldly stated, asignifying semiotics ‘can do 
without this kind of crutch’.15 Conversely, signifying 
semiologies are also capable of leaning on and 
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info-networks and the devices used to engage with 
them, namely bank and debit cards. Asignification 
is essentially informatic. Guattari consistently 
describes the assembling of particle-sign compo-
nents as a-subjective and machinic; in other words, 
as taking place without the mediation of subjectifi-
cation at all. Guattari did not reduce his machines 
to technical devices, yet his repeated description of 
how asignifying semiotics trigger processes within 
informatic networks highlights the interactions initi-
ated with a plastic card bearing a magnetic stripe in 
activating access to a bank or credit account and 
engaging in an elaborate authorisation process, 
which makes it clear that we are dealing with a 
complex, info-technological network. Guattari clari-
fies that this has a direct purchase on material 
machinic processes like ‘a credit card number which 
triggers the operation of a bank auto-teller’, acti-
vates accounts, and opens access to resources.21
Triggering is the key action of particle-
signs – signs that are partial, particle-like, and 
destratifying. This is Guattari’s sense of the passage 
of molecular signs: machinic superempowerment 
and diagrammatisation. Guattari extricates himself 
from the Pericean trap of subsuming diagrams 
under Icons (within Peirce’s Logic, diagrams are 
graphic representations – sketches, graphs, draw-
ings, skeletons – in mathematics) and then gains 
the positive implications of losing ‘aboutness’ as 
a criterion, bringing him into constructive coher-
ence with a critique of representation. He splits the 
image and diagram: the former belongs to symbolic 
semiologies and the latter to asignifying semiotics. 
In shifting into a molecular-machinic modality of 
explication, Guattari highlights a tightly controlled 
repetition, whose deployment is open-ended, but 
whose operations are not.
Particle-signs molecularise semiosis and are 
effectively blind to representation. They de-substan-
tialise by emptying semiological and semiotic 
triangles, both representamen-interpretant-object 
Guattari’s philosophy. The field of asignification 
becomes for Guattari that of non-human enun-
ciation in and among machinic systems: strictly 
speaking, ‘equations and plans which enunciate the 
machine and make it act in a diagrammatic capacity 
on technical and experimental apparatuses’.19 
This vast region includes everything from machine 
language ‘fetch and execute’ routines, to system 
interoperability at different levels of exchange, or 
to multi-levelled cybernetic loops. These are scien-
tifically formed by computer scientists and systems 
engineers. The convergence of asignification and 
a-subjectification is achieved most clearly in the 
critique of anthropocentrism through technology, but 
also through ethology (i.e., the Brown Stagemaker 
Bowerbird).
Asignifying semiotics must also define itself 
against signalling, since the non-necessity of 
semantic content in non-human communication is 
not negatively construed as denying something to 
someone (i.e., to signal using animals, from birds 
to primates, and how these are redeployed across 
species, as opposed to the ability of immune cells to 
multiply protectively against an invading microbe), 
and does not entail some variant of behaviorism. 
However, this is a complex issue because Guattari’s 
preference for ethological, not to mention microbial 
examples, is itself a deterritorialising move that 
is supposed to evacuate any residual ‘mind’ from 
asignification (of the sort that clings to senders, 
receivers, deceivers, and observers). This brings 
Guattari into the orbit of analytic philosophers of the 
signalling evolution, such as Brian Skyrms, who, in 
claiming that signals transmit information but lack 
intrinsic meaning, retains plasticity of signalling 
without recourse to a mental element.20 This evac-
uation of philosophy of mind has a parallel in the 
evacuation of the individuated subject’s fateful bond 
with the effects of the signifier.
By the time he wrote Chaosmosis, however, 
Guattari had become much more focused on 
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knows, there is normally more to the operation 
than the gestural act; today, we are more likely to 
‘tap’ our contactless access cards on ‘terminals’. 
Of course, Guattari’s use of particles tells us that 
the signs of asignifying semiotics are just as much 
virtual, ‘elementary’ entities which are generated by 
machinic interactions like acceleration and mathe-
matical prediction, and whose existence is verifiable 
theoretically. Indeed, particle-signs are the bearers 
of potentiality ‘beyond’ the material fluxes and 
concrete machines that manifest them.26
On the level of technomateriality, anyone who 
has received an error message during the process 
of inputting a PIN/password while undertaking a 
debit transaction or login operation understands 
the overt syntagmatic sensitivity of such signs 
(and in most cases the syntactical features – how 
many digits, upper and lower case sensitivity – of 
a password or PIN). Indeed, anyone who has ever 
had their card ‘eaten’ by a machine knows the vicis-
situdes of asignification – it may be just a jammed 
trigger, but it might also be a security counter-
measure prompted by the card’s use in a certain 
place, or for a certain purpose, inconsistent with 
an extrapolated pattern of usage. Moreover, when 
a card is, as one says, ‘all swiped out’ by intense 
usage after a shopping spree, the kind of interac-
tion between the oxide particles on its magnetic 
stripe and the card reader head that converts the 
encoding into binary digits goes awry because the 
magstripe is scratched or erased or demagnetised, 
thus introducing imbalance into the signal/noise 
ratio. Likewise, contactless smart cards conform to 
a number of international standards and protocols, 
operate within a fixed frequency in the case of radio 
frequency signal interfaces, and obey various wire-
less protocols, all the while transferring energy and 
data across a fixed amount of space. Asignifying 
part-signs do not slide; conversely, if they experi-
ence significant drift, they cease working, or show 
signs of having been hacked. 
or form-substance-matter types. This hole digging 
is constructive. Diagrammatic particle-signs are 
dynamic and productive (capable of multiple artic-
ulations) but rigorously constrained – meaning 
is not essential in this activity, but specific codes, 
algorithms, materials and standards are. Meaning 
is a kind of bug. Particle-signs work at the techno-
material level regardless of whether they signify 
something for someone or not. Of course they do 
signify, since most of us users rely on some sort 
of mnemonic device to remember our passcodes. 
As Guattari specifies, particle-signs do not ‘secrete 
significations’ – whether these are ‘thoughts’, 
‘psychical’ entities, or ‘mental’ representations: 
‘Signs “work” things prior to representation. Signs 
(form) and things (matter) combine with one 
another independently of the subjective “hold” that 
the agents of individuated enunciation (substance) 
claim to have over them.’22 However, having inca-
pacitated a disempowering representation and 
brought signs and things – the material and the 
semiotic – closer together, Guattari then muses on 
sign-particle ‘dust’ that emanates from the emptied 
triangles of meaning: ‘a thousand sharp points of 
deterritorialising particle-signs’ pricking the spaces 
of abstract potentiality.23 This centrifugal force of 
particle-signs is described by Guattari as bearing 
a ‘quantum of absolute deterritorialisation’ and is 
a ‘machinic superpower’ that ordinary, individuated 
subjects cannot interrupt or tame, though they will 
try. Shannon’s introduction of an ‘observer’ who 
would feedforward corrections is a good example of 
what Guattari envisaged as the erection of an ‘ideal 
point’ upon which communication is concentrated 
and controlled.24
Guattari’s asignifying particle-signs ‘give out 
start and stop orders’.25 It is easy to think of such 
particle-signs as the actual iron oxide particles on 
the tracks of the magnetic stripes of credit cards 
that are decoded – their polarities are immediately 
converted into binary digits when ‘swiped’ by a 
reader with the appropriate software. As everyone 
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Guattari, all molecular phenomena display a poli-
tics in lieu of a signified. The particle-signs are 
no different in this respect, though on the face 
of it, the move to quantity and machinic interac-
tions (automated triggers) belies it. Let’s return 
to the magstripe. On the stripe, which is located 
in a certain position on the plastic card, there are 
several tracks. These are not neutral tracks upon 
which the particles are lined up. Rather, of the three 
tracks available, the first was developed for use by 
the airline industry, whereas the second is used by 
financial institutions. Each track’s format was devel-
oped by and for specific interests. The cards meet 
a variety of international standards and function by 
means of specific algorithms. Recall the phrase 
quoted above: asignifying machines may be used 
to ‘automate’ the messages of the signifying semi-
ologies that, in a capitalist system, begin stirring at 
a young age, especially around basic training in 
capitalist behaviours, namely credit, into which one 
is socialised. One could argue that the very agree-
ments that permit these cards to work, namely 
standards, are a good example of what it means 
for any kind of sign to be flush with the world, but in 
virtue of international protocols and accreditations, 
quantified by ISO designations.30
Asignifying diagrammatic semiotics describes for 
Guattari:
[…] the very texture of the capitalist world […]. 
A-signifying machines recognize neither subjects, nor 
persons, nor roles, and not even delimited objects. 
That is precisely what confers upon them a kind of 
omnipotence; they pass through signifying systems 
within which individuated subjects find themselves 
lost and alienated. One never knows when or where 
capitalism ends.31
Asignifying semiotics is perfectly adapted to the 
networked banking systems we use on a regular 
basis. Their diagrammaticity will mobilise the next 
extensions, not yet actualised, of cash networks 
Whether they are randomly generated or care-
fully selected on the basis of paradigmatic clusters 
of birthdates, children’s ages, former addresses, 
initials, nicknames, etc., PINS/passwords, like the 
magstripe-reader encoding-decoding relation, can 
do without mental representations, which may 
of course exist, but they are not essential and no 
longer centre signification. Passwords just allow 
one to pass through the strata.
 There is a tendency in the information age for 
asignifying semiotics to maximise its machinic 
force – to rapidly evolve, speed up, acquire greater 
mobility, miniaturise and proliferate. In asignifying 
semiotics, particle-signs work ‘flush’ (travaillent à 
même) with the ‘real’; or more precisely, with mate-
rial fluxes. Guattari does not, however, uncritically 
valorise flushness as directness. At the same level 
as and in parallel with is perhaps better. Borrowing a 
notion from Peirce, even flushness does not require 
physical contact, just an indexical contiguity that is 
not limited to proximity but has connectivity. This 
underlines the networked nature of asignification 
with select matters: it could be mycellium or silicon.
Diagrammatism, in Guattari’s hands, blazes a 
trail beyond the human and individuated subject (of 
the statement) into the collective machinic dimen-
sion, escapees from the prison house of meaning: 
‘We leave the terrain of signification,’ Guattari wrote, 
‘for that of the plane of machinic consistency’;27 
that is, the continuum of interactions on which any 
machine is reducible to an individual only arbitrarily, 
and where hierarchies like those of ‘reifying denota-
tion and imaginary connotation are blurred’.28 With 
asignifying semiotics one enters the plane of the 
post-human, ‘more and more artificial’.29 Guattari 
didn’t shed any ‘humanist tears’ over those ill-
adapted to such change, rejecting anti-modern and 
anti-machine recapitulations of humanism.
Machinic liberation
Meaning may not be essential, but politics is. For 
21
and generation of machines by machines’.35
The immaterial labour hypothesis picks up the 
Guattarian emphasis on the abstract machinic char-
acter of particle-signs, which is evident in Franco 
Bifo Berardi’s observation that ‘semio-capital is 
capital-flux that coagulates in semiotic artefacts 
without materialising itself’.36 Coagulation without 
immediate materialisation is the condition of the 
semiotic fluxes. 
Conclusion
Why does what Guattari calls the ‘liberation’ of 
an asignifying semiotic machine seem to result in 
another species of capitalism? In the late 1970s, 
Guattari developed a distinction between signifying 
semiologies and asignifying semiotics in a manner 
that ‘remained very schematic’; in other words, insuf-
ficiently mixed: ‘a signifying semiology is always 
haunted by a sign machine and, conversely, an 
a-signifying sign machine is always in the process 
of being recuperated by a signifying semiology’.37 Of 
course, he identifies polarities – paranoid/fascist vs. 
schizo-nomadic – and specifies the apparatuses 
of capture in double articulation, how a language 
should be spoken, and the overcoding and axiomati-
sation of intensive deterritorialisations. The creative 
freedoms of a machinic diagram may be stratified 
and rendered impotent, yet the repeated assertion 
of such freedoms is in no way precluded. Guattari 
repeatedly asserted that there was no ‘dialectical 
synthesis’, no Aufhebung.38 Because asignifying 
semiotics connects with ‘traits’ – the particle-signs 
that are unformed both semiologically and physi-
cally – in which a distinction between expression 
and content is not yet definitively operative,39 it may 
push through the holes in the net and experiment 
with how particles connect and enunciate beyond 
the human, as it were, before becoming tangled 
in the binding mesh of representation, repression, 
organising and transformative subjectifications of 
pronominal voice (the splitting and de-diagramma-
tising of ‘it’ by the ‘I-ego’).40 In Figure 4, Guattari 
and placements of automated transaction termi-
nals, and new radio frequencies colonised by the 
next corporate players, and the coordinated triggers 
that open pathways through the network. Guattari 
explicitly turned to historical examples of banking 
systems (i.e., the Venice-Genoa-Pisa triangle in the 
Renaissance) in order to explain how the diagram-
matic potential of this ‘liberation’ of asignifying 
machines was successively limited throughout 
the history of banking by serving the principles of 
oligarchy, or debt, or centralisation.32
Today, the neologism ‘semiocapitalism’ combines 
a general semiotic and a contemporary formula 
of capitalism – which may or may not be the 
highest – and also participates in a periodisation of 
sorts, since the concept references the flexibilities 
of post-Fordism, evoking mobile productive spaces 
(post-factory), the rise of a precarious labour force 
for whom life is indistinguishable from work, and 
the financialisation of the economy. ‘Capitalism,’ 
as Guattari states, ‘seizes individuals from the 
inside.’33 Labour is a kind of machinic enslavement; 
in other words, it is integrated as a component 
part of a machinic process and functions as a 
relay for fluxes. Machinic enslavement works with 
asignifying particle-signs. Guattari observes that: 
‘Automatized and computerized production no 
longer draws its consistency from a basic human 
factor, but from a machinic phylum which traverses, 
bypasses, disperses, miniaturizes, and co-opts all 
human activities.’34 Labour involves the on-demand 
matching (re/combination) of semiotic fragments 
towards the composition of a semio-commodity 
within an integrative digital network in which labour 
time bleeds into life time.
Simply put, an info-commodity under semiocapi-
talism consists in a non-exclusive way of asignifying 
particle-signs whose production and passage 
through digital networks contribute to the develop-
ment of the machinic phylum, which is, for Guattari, 
the creative historical force of ‘selection, elimination 
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the individual, person, or even human subject. 
Guattari moved in this regard towards the horizon 
of one planetary machine, but it would be a mixed 
machine with a unique consciousness: the observer 
who was once a human subject will have become 
an automated algorithm. As foreboding as this may 
sound, Guattari was convinced that it presented an 
opportunity rather than a perilous outcome. Taken 
together, Guattari and Deleuze’s remarks on control 
societies contribute to a critical understanding 
of what it means to enter a world where pass-
words – access and denial – form a high stakes 
technopolitics which the cypherpunks phrase in a 
somewhat outmoded language of individual versus 
mass surveillance – the interception and storage 
of telecommunications data – but which, neverthe-
less, awaits the creation of the analytic tools that 
can trigger specific actions to exploit the situation.45 
Can asignifying semiosis vouchsafe a revolu-
tionary role in popularising cryptography? Following 
Guattari, the sharp-edged particle-signs radiated 
in the process of emptying the semiological strata, 
and emitted from the black holes of impotence and 
disempowerment, remain liberatory in their promise 
of creative transformation towards the autonomy of 
personal information. 
Once upon a time we were all groupuscules. 
Perhaps now we are all cypherpunks in training, 
and our politics is a struggle over asignification.
Postscript
The difference between asignifying semiotics and 
signifying semiologies is established by a shared set 
of categories of classification; indeed, they occupy a 
common strata. However, asignifying particle-signs 
utilise signifying semiologies as tools for deterritori-
alisation and for making novel connections between 
semiotic machines and material fluxes otherwise 
held apart within signifying semiologies (an individ-
uated subject detached from the real and bewitched 
by representative images). Guattari’s conceptual 
language extends to activity ‘triggers’ (start, stop), 
shows how asignification cuts across the strata, 
swerving around substance, from which it makes 
its escape by forging machinic connections. This 
diagram has many iterations; for instance, in The 
Machinic Unconscious and later in Schizoanalytic 
Cartographies, the swerve is the main focus [figs. 5 
and 6] and the background is absent. In Figures 
1-3, we saw how Shannon and Weaver’s additions 
to the transmission model – the qualified relabelling 
of existing, and the introduction of new, semantic 
components – compromised the machinic logic 
of the original, generating what Guattari would 
describe as a black hole effect: the implosiveness of 
a modelisation that attempts to deepen and justify 
the irrelevance of meaning for transmission by 
absorbing ‘meaning’ components into it, dampening 
its own growth by recourse to personalisation. We 
also saw Weaver’s slipping of residual ‘minds’41 into 
machinic communication, not to mention Shannon’s 
all-seeing observer.
Yet this gerrymandering nevertheless spreads 
the elementary ‘dust’ of particle-signs, which stick 
to the components and have the power to scramble 
them, to disaggregate assemblages by decen-
tring mental representation and to disindividuate 
desire.42 As Guattari put it, ‘In diagrammatism, 
substantial semantic or signifying residues of the 
object [denoted or represented] and of the means 
of expression are always superfluous. Semanticism 
or signifiance are only tolerated in a provisional 
way, and the expectation is always that they will be 
reduced at the next stage of technical and scientific 
progress.’43
Guattari imagined the existence of elementary 
particle-signs which carried ‘quanta of deterritoriali-
zation’ in order to find an escape from the strata and 
provide an energy source for his asignifying semi-
otics.44 In not offering a neat solution to the capture 
of and release from the strata, he indicated that he 
was committed to a progressive view of the deterri-
torialisation of collective enunciative power beyond 
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redundancies, implosions of separated strata, 
collectivisation of individuated human conscious-
ness, and multiplication of double articulation 
(stalling this colonising machine). As destratifica-
tion picks up speed and frees up more intensive 
processes, raw material for asignifying semiotics is 
generated. This raw material, once assembled (self-
organised and/or machined), is none other than 
the particle-signs that asignifying machinic proc-
esses make use of. Guattari writes: ‘Consequently, 
these territorial residues reorganize themselves into 
a-signifying particles; they will provide raw mate-
rial for a-signifying semiotic machines beyond the 
reach of the impotentizing advances of reflexive 
consciousness.’51
Asignifying semiotics is not a meta-code or 
modelling in the sense that myth is a metalan-
guage – Barthes’s so-called ‘second language’. A 
meta-model for Guattari is critical of the model at 
which it points. The model in this case is signifying 
semiology, which has a ‘limitless hegemonic claim’52 
on signification. This very ambition is displayed 
by Barthes in his understanding of the ‘language-
object’ or linguistic sign in its globality (qua sign 
which ‘lends itself’ to myth): it does not require a 
distinction between writing and pictures as they are 
not simply signs. However, myth is also a colonising 
force of language and it works by any number of 
tactics: parasitism, amplification, insinuation, conju-
ration… Ultimately, myth remains a signifying 
semiology. On this point, then, Barthes and Guattari 
diverge, despite the superficial structural similarity 
their thought displays in the categories of analysis 
and how they relate (though Guattari’s is more 
diverse and shows greater resistance to semiolog-
ical ambition).
Barthes’s traits of the obtuse function at the level 
of the signifier are akin to Guattari’s particles, but 
the latter are not creatures of the signifier. Rather, 
they are framed in terms of fluxes articulated by 
expression and relational (and reversible) content 
sentinels on magnetic stripe cards, the devices 
that read them, and the networks that circulate 
the decoded data. However, as we have seen, the 
example of asignifying mycellium feeding on nutri-
ents – a rich semiological humus – before fruiting is 
equally relevant for Guattari. 
The first question raised with regard to the rela-
tionship between these two kinds of semiosis is 
this: how do they relate to Roland Barthes’ model 
of semiological accumulation in the stacked and 
staggered systems of meaning? There is a second 
question. Does Barthes, with the concept of a 
signifier’s obtuse meaning, achieve an insight into 
asignification comparable to Guattari’s?
In his study of myth, Barthes describes how a 
first-order linguistic semiological system is built 
upon by a second-order mythological system by 
means of converting the unity of the first signifier 
and signified as sign (final) into a new signifier 
(first) for a second signified and unified sign. This 
is an operation of ‘construction’, Barthes says;46 it 
is the conception of final as first. Myth capitalises on 
semiological patterns and uses them as ‘raw mate-
rials’47 to erect a politics marked by a sly disavowal 
of ideology – what Barthes called ‘de-politicized 
speech’.
By contrast, Guattari assigned to asignifying 
semiotics a disruptive and difficult micropolitical 
task of ‘eating into the semiology of the dominant 
order’.48 In order to accomplish this task, it ‘will 
retain a certain partial use’49 of signifying semi-
ologies, which will always have a supportive but 
not central role to play in asignifying proliferation. 
With asignifying semiotics, Guattari specifies: ‘The 
dregs of the signifier, figures of expression and pre-
diagrammatic assemblages, are essential elements 
for the engineering of accelerators of particle-signs, 
the derritorialising power of which will be capable 
of smashing the strata of encoding.’50 Residues of 
signification accumulate in the collapse of signifying 
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are reticent about signifying anything to anyone. 
Yet Barthes, too, enlists ‘indifferen[ce] to the 
story’60 as a feature of obtuse meaning. But there 
is more. Barthes insists on the ‘im-pertinence of the 
signifer’61 as a robust feature of indifference to the 
obvious meaning of a story. He describes it as a 
‘de-naturing’ effect, a ‘distancing’ from the referent 
by means of intense sounds and colours without 
‘natural’ reference points. These remain ‘depleted’ 
and are not filled by signifiers. 
On this medium Barthes and Guattari converge: 
film is a prime site for asignifying semiosis. In 
discussing Badlands (T. Malick, 1973), Guattari 
insists on what the critics missed: the agonising blue 
of the enormous skies of the location; the amour fou 
of the young couple; the asignifying connections that 
go nowhere (father’s murder – retrieval of a toaster 
from the scene and its relocation to an encampment 
without electricity).62 Rather than drawing upon 
Barthes, Guattari draws upon Christian Metz for 
his explanation of the asignifying fabrics (sonorous 
and visual) of cinema that resist signifying semiolo-
gies. This is what Barthes called the filmic as such, 
irreducible to the film: ‘The filmic […] lies precisely 
[…] in that region where articulated language is 
no longer more than approximative and where 
another language begins (whose science, there-
fore, cannot be linguistics, soon discarded like a 
booster rocket).’63 Guattari finds in Metz the impor-
tance of film’s images that are ‘matters of content’ 
which remain undefined, and ‘matters of expres-
sion’ that are unfixed.64 But Barthes never really 
discards linguistics, building a vast semio-linguistic 
universe of interpretation. At the same time, Barthes 
isolated certain outer limits in his own practice while 
retaining – and this is an obvious point – obtuse 
meaning (extra-structural) beyond linguistically 
articulable and structuralisable meaning-effects. He 
reached the margins by focusing, self-consciously 
and paradoxically, on film stills, in order to grasp the 
processes of cinema.
planes, and subsequently smoothed machinically 
(energised) as they are deterritorialised: ‘passive 
figures of expression are transformed into active 
particle-signs’.53 In short, traits from signaletic fluxes 
are extracted into particle-signs and put into play in 
combination with fluxes of energy. Having broken 
from the linguistic signifier, Guattari’s ‘“basic” enti-
ties’54 pass from extensive (space-time location and 
sensible traits) to intensive states (full with potential 
and multilocational) by means of the expression-
content function and not the signifier-signified 
relation between psychical entities (sound-image 
and concept). Still, Barthes is not content with a 
simple definition of obtuse meaning as a signifier 
without a signified because it cannot be named, is 
non-representational, and eludes the language of 
criticism: ‘we do without language yet never cease 
to understand one another’.55 Guattari takes much 
the same attitude: ‘It [a-signifying semiotics] can 
do without this kind of crutch (signifying language) 
[…].’56 Barthes and Guattari are close to agreeing 
that the obtuse/asignificational is non-representa-
tional, and that these figures are not easily absorbed 
into criticism, but with an important qualification. For 
Guattari, meta-modelling is a critical assay launched 
not from above but from among many models.
It is productive to tarry a bit longer with Barthes 
as he has also proposed what appears to be 
an asignifying semiotic element in the concept 
of obtuse meaning. Recapitulating his stacked 
systems, Barthes proposes a three-tier system of 
meaning in his analysis of stills from Eisenstein’s 
film Ivan the Terrible: the first is information or 
communication – ‘what I can learn from the setting, 
the costumes, the characters, their relations’;57 
a second is a significational or stratified symbolic 
level consisting of various symbolisms – referential, 
diegetic, Eisenteinian, historical; and a third level of 
significance consists in signifying traits that do not 
yield a signified. Obtuse meaning is ‘excessive’.58 
Whereas obtuse meaning is, as Barthes remarks, 
‘persistent and fleeting’,59 Guattari’s particle-signs 
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The crossing points between Barthes’ obtuse 
meaning and Guattari’s asignifying semiotics are 
sufficiently dense as to warrant close consideration. 
Just as I showed with regard to the remodellings of 
Shannon and Weaver, the invention of asignifica-
tion with Barthes in the equation remains stuck in 
an intermediary state of advances and rearguard 
actions in the name of meaning. The eclipse of 
meaning, as Guattari reminds us, is never accom-
plished once and for all. It is not so much a temporary 
obscuration as a counter-hegemonic destabilisation 
and decentring of signification that opens up hitherto 
closed routes of escape, but is not itself immune to 
cycles of liberation and recapture.
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